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Abstract
Background: Despite universal population coverage and equity being a stated policy goal of its NHIS, over a
decade since passage of the first law in 2003, Ghana continues to struggle with how to attain it. The predominantly
(about 70 %) tax funded NHIS currently has active enrolment hovering around 40 % of the population. This study
explored in-depth enablers and barriers to enrolment in the NHIS to provide lessons and insights for Ghana and other
low and middle income countries (LMIC) into attaining the goal of universality in Universal Health Coverage (UHC).
Methods: We conducted a cross sectional mixed methods study of an urban and a rural district in one region of
Southern Ghana. Data came from document review, analysis of routine data on enrolment, key informant in-depth
interviews with local government, regional and district insurance scheme and provider staff and community member
in-depth interviews and focus group discussions.
Results: Population coverage in the NHIS in the study districts was not growing towards near universal because of
failure of many of those who had ever enrolled to regularly renew annually as required by the NHIS policy. Factors
facilitating and enabling enrolment were driven by the design details of the scheme that emanate from national level
policy and program formulation, frontline purchaser and provider staff implementation arrangements and contextual
factors. The factors inter-related and worked together to affect client experience of the scheme, which were not always
the same as the declared policy intent. This then also affected the decision to enrol and stay enrolled.
Conclusions: UHC policy and program design needs to be such that enrolment is effectively compulsory in practice. It
also requires careful attention and responsiveness to actual and potential subscriber, purchaser and provider (stakeholder)
incentives and related behaviour generated at implementation levels.
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Background
The United Nations General Assembly adopted the
Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) at its seventieth
session in September 2015. The SDG vision statement
for health includes: “To promote physical and mental
health and well being, and to extend life expectancy for
all, we must achieve universal health coverage and access
to quality health care” [1]. Universal Health Coverage
(UHC) is a means to an end rather than an end in itself.
Very simply it strives to “ensure that all people have
access to needed, quality health services without suffering
financial hardship” [2].
Ghana’s current UHC journey began in 2003 when the
National Health Insurance Act 650 was passed by parlia-
ment. At that time, the policy objectives of the Ghana
National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) were stated
as: “(…) to assure equitable and universal access for all
residents of Ghana to an acceptable quality package of
essential healthcare” [3].
The design of the Ghana NHIS is a single payer model,
with a National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF) made of
contributions from a 2.5 % Value Added Tax, known as
the National Health insurance levy; 2.5 percentage point
of the Social Security and National Insurance Trust
(SSNIT) contributions of SSNIT contributors; and an
out of pocket premium for non SSNIT contributors
(mainly but not exclusively informal sector workers) of
approximately Ghanaian cedi (GHS) 7.20 – 48.00 (USD
1 = GHS 3.75 as at 4/5/16) per head per annum. About
60 % of Ghana’s population comprising SSNIT contributors
and pensioners, those deemed too poor to pay including
Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP) benefi-
ciaries (indigents), children less than 18 years of age, per-
sons aged above 70 and pregnant women are exempt from
paying out of pocket premiums. However these exempt
groups, like the groups that pay out of pocket pre-
miums need to go annually to a district insurance
scheme office or community agent to enroll or renew
enrollment. Additionally, apart from indigents, LEAP
beneficiaries and pregnant women, all subscribers pay
an annual registration fee equivalent to approximately
USD 2 per head per annum for enrolment and card
processing. The LEAP program is a government of
Ghana social cash transfer program that provides cash
and health insurance to households across the country
classified as extremely poor using the program target-
ing mechanisms [4]. Ninety percent (90 %) of LEAP
households have at least one member enrolled in the
NHIS [5].
The NHIS was introduced in 2003 as a politically
decentralized or devolved district mutual health insurance
scheme model, with local government (district assemblies)
responsible to set up and oversee the district schemes.
Because of concerns about the quality of management
and fiscal control, the system was reformed in 2012
with the passage of a revised national health insurance
law (Act 852), which created an administratively decen-
tralized or deconcentrated model. The semi-autonomous
district mutual health insurance schemes were converted
into branch offices of the National Health Insurance
Authority (NHIA). The NHIA established regional offices
in each of the ten regions of Ghana to oversee the district
offices. The new law consolidated a pre-existing tendency
to increase central control and move from a devolved
to a deconcentrated system of management. The re-
form enabled tighter central fiscal control of frontline
purchaser staff and services. However, to some extent it
also distanced services from the District Assemblies
(local government). It is not clear this has had any effect
on enrolment.
Enrolment in the NHIS has stagnated at about 40 %
of the population, after rising rapidly in the early years
of its establishment [6]. Even out of pocket premium
exempt groups do not all enroll and renew enrolment
in the scheme. There are also inequities in enrolment.
The Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2012 report [7]
showed that the percentage of men and women ever
registered in the NHIS rises with income from the low-
est quintile through to the highest. The 2008 [8], 2014
[9] Ghana Demographic and Health surveys and other
work e.g., the SHINE project household survey data on
NHIS enrolment in the Central and Eastern regions
carried out in 2009 show similar patterns [10]. Routine
health management information system and survey data
show higher utilization of health care services among
the insured as compared to the uninsured. The differences
in enrolment between income quintiles translate into dif-
ferences in utilization that further magnify the inequities
under the NHIS. Thus the inequities in voluntary NHIS
enrolment translate into inequities in service utilization
and access [11]. Beyond income quintiles, survey as well
as routine management information system data of the
NHIS shows differences in population coverage between
regions, demographic groups as well as ‘premium exempt’
versus ‘non-premium exempt’ groups. Given the persisting
inequities in enrolment, despite multiple out of pocket
premium exempt categories; it would appear getting
closer to universal population coverage, rather than tar-
geted exemptions may be a better option for improving
the equity and catastrophic protective effect of Ghana’s
NHIS.
This study aimed to understand why enrolment within
the NHIS has stagnated at the current levels and the
implications for NHIS policy and program design and
implementation towards universal population coverage.
Specifically, we explored who is enrolling and renewing
enrolment in the NHIS and reasons, barriers and enablers
that explain the observations.
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Review of the literature
Ghana’s National Health Insurance scheme grew out of
preceding community based health insurance (CBHI)
schemes. Despite innovations such as tax funding through
a value added tax, a single pooled national fund, and
national health insurance authority with regional and dis-
trict offices as the purchaser, several design feature such
as voluntary enrolment derive from the CBHI model.
There are several studies of enrolment in voluntary CBHI
schemes in LMIC. Almost all of them show low enrol-
ment and difficulties in attaining universal population
coverage. In rural West Africa and Uganda, factors such
as institutional rigidities and socio-cultural practices, were
documented as playing an important role in shaping the
decision to voluntarily enroll [12, 13]. The findings of two
recent reviews [14, 15] of enrolment in voluntary insur-
ance schemes in LMIC showed similar clusters of factors
affecting enrolment. Factors related to service provision
such as poor health care quality including stock outs of
medicines and other critical service delivery inputs, long
waiting times and poor health worker attitudes were one
cluster of problems that affected enrolment. A second
cluster was insurance scheme factors such as trust in the
scheme, timing and modulation of premium collection
and scheme rules. A third cluster was related to clients
socio-demographic, economic and other characteristics
such as education, gender, income and community know-
ledge and understanding of social health insurance princi-
ples in general and the scheme arrangements in particular.
In Ghana, a few studies have shown similar factors at
play in the stagnation of enrolment in the NHIS. Lower
socio-economic status and large household sizes have
been found to contribute to the inability to afford full
insurance for households [16]. In a 2008 citizens’ assess-
ment of the NHIS, 77 % of household respondents, who
had not enrolled with the NHIS, cited affordability as
the reason [17]. The price of NHIS, provider attitudes,
peer pressure and convenience were found to be strongly
associated with the decision to enroll voluntarily and
retain membership within the Ghana NHIS [10].
To guide our data collection, we drew on this literature,
and theorized that factors affecting NHIS enrolment could
be classified as related to the purchaser, the provider, the
client and context.
Methods
Background of the study area
The Volta region, one of the ten regions of Ghana, was
purposively selected for the study because the co-sponsor
for the study, the Korea Foundation for International
Healthcare (KOFIH) was involved in supporting Maternal
and Child Health programs in that region. Additionally, it
was one of three regions where phase two of the scale up
of the NHIS per capita provider payment system for
primary care was planned, and findings from the study
were considered of relevance to the scale up.
In the 2010 national population census the Volta region
had a population of a little over two million, about 8.6 %
of Ghana’s population [18]. Its inter censal growth rate of
2.5 % was the same as the national average. Ghana has
a relatively young population with 43 % of the popula-
tion aged less than 18 years and the Volta region is no
different.
A municipality and a rural district adjoining each
other, were purposively selected to study contrasting
contexts of an urbanized district with relatively good
health service access and a rural district with poor health
service access. For reasons of research ethics and confi-
dentiality, we do not use the names of the districts or
the communities in which the study was conducted in
this publication.
The Municipality had a population of almost three
hundred thousand in the 2010 population and housing
census. It had relatively good social, economic and
healthcare infrastructure, water and sanitary conditions,
and fairly high literacy rates compared to the rest of the
region. It had 45 health facilities including a regional
and municipal hospital, with 43 run by the Ghana
Health Service, one mission and one privately owned.
Formal sector economic activity comprised mainly of
employment in the public service, private services sector
and private construction companies. Non formal sector
economic activities were petty trading, subsistence farming,
animal rearing, artisans and vocations such as hairdressing
and dressmaking. It had an NHIS district scheme office.
The population of the rural district was about 64,404
in the 2010 population and housing census. The district
lacked basic social and economic infrastructure such as
road networks, telecommunication, industry, banking
etc. and had serious problems with access to healthcare,
water and sanitation facilities. The main occupations
were farming, Kente weaving and petty trading [19]. The
Administrative Capital had one health centre with a
trained midwife, nurses, dispenser and other supporting
staffs. There was no hospital. Other sources of modern
biomedical health care in the district were two health
centres and several small clinics and Community Health
Planning and Services compounds.
Study design and data collection methods
We employed an exploratory, mixed methods cross
sectional case study design. Data collection involved ex-
traction of routine management information system data
from the district insurance scheme records, community
focus group discussions (FGD) and key informant (KI)
interviews. We also reviewed NHIS policy and program
document such as acts of parliament, legislative instru-
ments and annual reports.
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Sampling
Within each district, two communities each were selected
for the community member FGD and key informant inter-
views. Criteria for selection were that in each district, one
community should be within half an hour’s walking dis-
tance and the other an hour or more’s walking distance of
the hospital (municipality) or health centre (rural district).
Within each of the study districts, a mix of purposive
and snowball sampling was used to select respondents
for key informant interviews to get the views of key stake-
holders namely purchaser (NHIA district scheme staff ),
providers, district assembly (local government) and
clients. NHIA district scheme staff interviewed, were
the district scheme manager (head of the team), Public
Relations Officer, Management Information Systems
officer. Within each district assembly (local government),
those interviewed were the district Chief Executive, Finance
Officer, Coordinating Directors, Assembly men (elected
community representatives of the district assembly),
heads of unit and area committees and opinion leaders.
Providers interviewed were the district director of
health services, and health insurance claims officers at
the health facilities. NHIA regional management staff
were also interviewed.
In total 35 in-depth interviews were held. Interviews
lasted between 30–70 min and were held in the offices
and communities of the respondents. There were some
rare situations where interviews were arranged and held
at the homes of respondents for their convenience.
Community focus group discussions were held with
adult groups of currently enrolled, previously enrolled
but currently uninsured because of failure to renew, and
never insured in each of the four communities. Participants
were purposively selected to ensure a mix of male and
female and range of ages between 18 and 82. Community
FGD were also held with insured pregnant women. They
were recruited from pregnant women attending antenatal
clinics and from the study communities. Pregnant women
who participated in the FGD were between the ages 17–45.
All focus group discussions were held in the commu-
nity in the dominant local language, Ewe, and lasted
between 30 – 60 min. In all 12 focus group discussions
of between 8 – 11 persons per group were held.
All Interviews were moderated by members of the
research team assisted by research assistants who were
recruited and trained for the purpose. Interviews were
tape recorded in addition to the interviewers notes and
transcribed verbatim into English so all team members
could read the notes. All interviews and recordings were
done with informed consent (Additional file 1).
Data analysis
Qualitative data was analysed manually using thematic
content analysis of the text around the study questions
guided by the analytical framework for the study. Routine
management information systems data on enrolment was
analysed in Excel for percentages, patterns and trends.
Results
Who is enrolling in the NHIS?
Table 1 and 2 summarizes data from the two district
schemes on new enrolment, renewals and total active
membership as well as enrolment by category from
2010 – 2013. The data suggests that renewals of enrol-
ment are increasing, while new enrolments are some-
what stagnant. The net result is a steady increase in
total enrolment in both districts with a level of between
40 – 50 % at the time of the study. These observations
from the data mirrored the perceptions of respondents
in the primary data collection.
The Ghana NHIS law (Act 852 and the preceding
Act 650) all define out of pocket premium exempt
categories. These include children under 18, the elderly
defined as those over 70, persons with mental disorders,
pregnant women and the indigent (too poor to pay); and
also SSNIT contributors and SSNIT pensioners because of
Table 1 Trends in new registrations and renewals by district from 2010 – 2013
Year New registrations Renewals Active membership Total pop % Total pop.
new registration
% Total pop renewal % Total pop
active membership
Municipal mutual health insurance scheme
2010 40,824 42,736 83,560 271,881 0.15 0.16 0.31
2011 31,170 68,794 99,964 275,062 0.11 0.25 0.36
2012 28,268 90,401 118,669 278,280 0.10 0.32 0.43
2013 32,922 109,746 142,668 281,536 0.12 0.39 0.51
Rural district mutual health insurance scheme
2010 6594 7426 14,020 64,404 0.10 0.12 0.22
2011 9036 10,901 19,937 65,158 0.14 0.17 0.31
2012 16,480 15,479 31,959 65,920 0.25 0.23 0.48
2013 10,082 20,811 30,893 66,691 0.15 0.31 0.46
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Table 2 Registration by category in the two districts from 2010 – 2013
2010 2011 2012 2013
New Renewal Total % of total New Renewal Total % of total New Renewal Total % of total New Renewal Total % of total
Rural district mutual health insurance scheme
Adult informal 1557 1748 3305 23.6 % 1655 2477 4132 20.7 % 2879 3267 6146 19.2 % 965 4046 5011 16.2 %
Aged 610 1049 1659 11.8 % 300 1401 1701 8.5 % 375 1565 1940 6.1 % 284 1624 1908 6.2 %
Children under 5 10 - 10 0.1 % 37 9 46 0.2 % 68 39 107 0.3 % 65 84 149 0.5 %
Dependent 2286 2563 4849 34.6 % 4115 3771 7886 39.6 % 5713 5601 11,314 35.4 % 4512 7695 12,207 39.5 %
Indigent 883 1301 2184 15.6 % 1573 2075 3648 18.3 % 5472 3421 8893 27.8 % 3114 5471 8585 27.8 %
Pregnant women 1091 309 1400 10.0 % 1210 579 1789 9.0 % 1280 892 2172 6.8 % 821 880 1701 5.5 %
SSNIT 144 418 562 4.0 % 133 572 705 3.5 % 82 707 789 2.5 % 51 739 790 2.6 %
Unknown category 13 38 51 0.4 % 13 17 30 0.2 % 611 5 616 1.9 % 270 272 542 1.8 %
Grand total 6594 7426 14,020 100.0 % 9036 10,901 19,937 100.0 % 16,480 15,497 31,977 100.0 % 10,082 20,811 30,893 100.0 %
Municipal district mutual health insurance scheme
Adult informal 16,745 15,551 32,296 38.7 % 13,257 26,311 39,568 39.6 % 10,128 35,503 45,631 38.5 % 9125 41,486 50,611 35.5 %
Aged 3677 3946 7623 9.1 % 1080 6765 7845 7.8 % 578 7212 7790 6.6 % 538 7246 7784 5.5 %
Children under 5 40 5 45 0.1 % 207 30 237 0.2 % 289 194 483 0.4 % 367 425 792 0.6 %
Dependent 10,926 12,827 23,753 28.4 % 10,541 19,246 29,787 29.8 % 11,717 27,088 38,805 32.7 % 12,331 34,984 47,315 33.2 %
Indigent 3176 3175 6351 7.6 % 2457 5231 7688 7.7 % 2907 7397 10,304 8.7 % 8739 11,025 19,764 13.9 %
Pregnant women 2258 1221 3479 4.2 % 2421 2288 4709 4.7 % 2104 3104 5208 4.4 % 1435 2918 4353 3.1 %
SSNIT 3305 5879 9184 11.0 % 1176 8877 10,053 10.1 % 543 9794 10,337 8.7 % 373 10,560 10,933 7.7 %
Unknown category 697 132 829 1.0 % 31 46 77 0.1 % 2 109 111 0.1 % 14 1102 1116 0.8 %















the direct deduction of 2.5 % of social security contribu-
tions. (Act 852 section 29). Almost all the categories are
“demand” driven in the sense that the clients are the ones
who define themselves based on their demographics (age)
or situation (e.g., pregnancy) that are easily verifiable. The
category of indigents, however, is supply driven in the
sense that apart from LEAP beneficiaries; it is the district
scheme management that ultimately takes the decision as
to who is an indigent.
Why are people enrolling (or not)?
Reasons why people are enrolling or not in the NHIS
that emerged from our data could be classified as factors
related to purchaser, provider, client and context as we
theorized at the beginning. However, from a more ana-
lytic perspective of organizing our data to help provide
answers to the “why” of observed enrolment patterns we
found it more useful to reorganize the purchaser and
provider factors into those predominantly influenced by
national policy and program arrangements and those
more influenced by peripheral implementation arrange-
ments of frontline (mainly district level) purchaser and
provider staff. Moreover, our observations that could be
classified as “client factors” such as unexpected and un-
affordable out of pocket payments; and opportunity
costs of enrolling in and using the NHIS (mainly time
and transport costs) that deterred enrolment were more
accurately client experiences triggered by one or more of
the factors classified as national policy or frontline pro-
vider and purchaser implementation arrangements.
The factors worked in an inter-related manner rather
than in isolation. We therefore organized our findings
into an explanatory framework as summarized in Fig. 1.
National policy
By national policy, we refer to the national level NHIS
program decisions, legislative and administrative arrange-
ments, rules and procedures that dictated how the scheme
should be implemented. These arrangements in stipu-
lating what should be done and how, created intended
as well as unintended incentives and sometimes con-
flicts in context, for client, purchaser and provider be-
haviour that affected enrolment positively or negatively.
They included factors such as how the scheme is fi-
nanced, who pays and who benefits, enrolment rules,
how providers are paid and the prescribed benefit
package.
Perceptions of who pays and who benefits
Some of the targeted out of pocket premium exemptions
contributed to a perception among insurance staff and
community leaders that the scheme was predominantly
for the benefit of pregnant women and children under
18 and not so much for other sections of the population.
It was also seen to be more attractive for these categories
to preferentially enrol.
“(…) under 18 and pregnant women are
enrolling because of the policy put in place.”
(Scheme Staff, Municipality)
Though the “indigent” are also out of pocket premium
exempt there was no perception that they were benefit-
ting more from the scheme than others. Their numbers
enrolled in the scheme were very small in both districts
and only jumped up dramatically in 2013. Insurance
scheme staff felt this was because the definition of indi-
gents lacked clarity in the national policy.
OUTCOMES
• First time enrolment

















Fig. 1 Summary of factors affecting enrollment
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“Indigents are also not enrolling because the
indigent clause is so stiff. The pointers to who
an indigent is were not clear.” (Scheme staff )
Annual enrolment and renewal
Community leaders, local government members and in-
surance scheme staff observed that most users do not
remember the expiry dates of their insurance cards.
Often it was only when they ended up in hospital for a
health problem that they became aware their cards had
expired.
“I think most of the people when their card
expire, they don’t even know, they get to the
facility to access medical attention before
realizing that their cards have expired.”
(local government staff )
SSNIT contributor and pensioner disinterest
District scheme staff observed that for several different
reasons SSNIT contributors and pensioners were not en-
rolling much in the NHIS. SSNIT contributors generally
have relatively more stable jobs and therefore predictable
income. Some of those who could afford it preferred to
go to private facilities rather than the Government facilities
covered by the NHIS card, because of perceptions of better
quality of care in private facilities. Having to go to the
scheme offices and join the queues to pay a registration fee
to renew their cards despite the deduction of 2.5 % of their
social security contributions into the National Health
Insurance fund was also a disincentive to enrolling.
Non SSNIT subscribers out of pocket premiums
Another design challenge had to do with the premiums
and renewal fees for non SSNIT subscribers. In theory
these rates were supposed to be on a sliding scale pro-
portional to wealth and ability to pay. In practice there
was no robust sliding scale design available to assess
ability to pay and premium rates were effectively flat for
all subscribers irrespective of their income levels. In the
rural district many community members, as well as
scheme and local government staff, felt that the pre-
miums and registration fees were higher than the ability
of community members to pay; and therefore a barrier
to enrolment. This was less of a challenge in the urban
municipality.
“…….they don’t have money because most of
them are peasant farmers and only farm to eat.”
(Local government staff, Rural District)
The NHIS allows individual rather than mandated
community or family registration. Some respondents
were of the opinion that the non SSNIT subscribers,
especially those between the ages of 18 and mid 40s
were not enrolling because they felt their risk was low.
“The informal sectors are not enrolling because
they happen to be the strong group in the age
brackets (above 18 to mid-40s) where they hardly
fall sick, so they don’t see the reason why they
should come for an insurance card.”
(Former Scheme Manager)
Opportunity costs
The opportunity costs, mainly time and transport, of
having to actively go to a center to enroll as well as the
direct costs (out of pocket premiums) to be paid at the
time of enrolment also contributed to the disinterest of
the healthy whether SSNIT or non SSNIT subscriber to
enroll in the absence of compulsion.
Claims reimbursement
A major problem mentioned by purchaser and provider
staff were the delays in provider claims reimbursement
and its effects on provider responsiveness to clients,
client satisfaction and ultimately enrolment. The National
Health Insurance Fund (NHIF) is a centrally pooled and
managed fund with funds flowing from the Ghana
Revenue Authority which collects taxes and the SSNIT
through the Ministry of Finance to the NHIA to pay pro-
viders. Releases to frontline providers are the end of a
chain that starts at national level. The timing of the re-
leases was largely beyond the control of frontline pur-
chaser staff in the district schemes. The long delays
affected implementation by their effects on provider
coping behaviour. This is discussed further under front-
line provider implementation factors.
Identity card processing and issuing
Respondents in both districts identified delays in pro-
cessing and issuing NHIS identity cards as another
reason for people losing interest in enrolment. The rules
as to what kind of identification is used to guarantee
benefits are dictated by national level policy arrange-
ments and guidelines.
At the time of the study the NHIA had introduced an
NHIS instant biometric card system in other regions to
resolve the delays. Implementation had not yet started in
the Volta region. Some scheme staffs felt the planned
biometric registration system would be key to ameliorating
this problem. However others were worried because of
widespread negative reports of the system delaying rather
than speeding up card issue from colleagues in regions
where biometric registration had started.
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District NHIS office staff and logistics
The district scheme offices were faced with challenges
related to inadequate funding, staff and logistics, that
affected their performance. Allocation of funding, staffing
and logistics in the district scheme offices is largely con-
trolled centrally.
“(…) look at this office, it is only now that we are
moving to a new place just because we are not able
to raise enough fund to do things for ourselves (…)
we don’t have enough money to run the office.”
(Health Insurance staff, Rural district)
Health facility availability and resources
Resources for health facility construction and decisions
on locations of health facilities in the public sector are
often centrally controlled with resources availability for
infrastructure development inadequate in relation to
needs. The absence of a district hospital with basic ser-
vices such as laboratory tests, scans etc. was a major bar-
rier to registration and renewal in the rural district. In
both districts, health facilities available were inadequate
for the numbers seeking care. There was sometimes con-
gestion in waiting areas, long waiting times and inad-
equate and overburdened health staff.
‘’Where I visit the space is small and the
equipment are also not adequate. You also
spend a lot of time waiting because it is the
same doctor attending to everyone (…)”
(Community member Urban district)
People also had unmet expectations about the content
of service related to the skills and capabilities of staff. In
many of the FGDs; community members perceived quality
of care as including seeing a ‘certified medical doctor (…)’
and/or ‘being given lots of medicines and an injection for
the treatment of an ailment (…)’. Health workers and the
scheme officers were aware of these perceptions and
expectations.
‘(’…). when there is no doctor in the health facility
they (community members) find it very difficult to
have that confidence to go to seek health at the
facilities; so for now I think there should be a district
hospital that is run by a medical doctor and not
a medical assistant or physician assistant because
some of the diagnosis it means we have to refer.”
(Scheme Manager Rural district)
In the better served urban area FGD, the frequently
expressed problems with staff skills and referrals in the
rural area FGD came up less as issues of concern.
Frontline purchaser implementation arrangements
Frontline purchaser implementation arrangements for
the purposes of this study are defined as the actions and
inactions of district staff of the national health insurance
authority responsible for implementation of the scheme.
Within the context of the policies, rules and regulations
stipulated for the NHIS, they had significant power to
inhibit or facilitate the achievement of the objectives of
the national health insurance scheme in implementation
by using discretion. Issues related to decision making
and executing at the level of frontline purchaser staff in-
cluded deciding who was an indigent, formal and infor-
mal payments for ID cards, and responsiveness to clients
(customer relationships).
Formal out of pocket payments in scheme offices
Some scheme staff observed that local processing fees
introduced for SSNIT pensioners because their former
employers were not paying these fees seemed to be acting
as a barrier to enrolment.
“The pensioners: Initially they were not charged
anything but we realized that those institutions who
promised to pay their processing fee were not paying,
so we decided to charge them processing fee of 2.00.
Some of them have refused to pay the 2.00 so they
don’t come to register.” (Scheme Staff, Rural district)
Informal out of pockets payments in scheme offices
Community members in both districts mentioned infor-
mal payments during enrolment as one of the hindrances
to enrolment. NHIS registration agents as well as some in-
surance staff were alleged to be charging under-the-table
fees for services, which were supposed to be free.
"(…) they say your card is not working again so
you have to renew it. They will say bring something
before they renew it, and because you too you don't
have money you go; and you are sick but because
you don’t have money you can't renew it."
(Insured member, Rural Community)
District scheme office responsiveness to clients
Another purchaser implementation challenge mentioned
in both districts was poor frontline purchaser staff cus-
tomer relations. Clients in the FGD shared negative ex-
periences in the scheme offices such as: "The officers
shout at you when you are young.", "Even when you are
old they shout at you.", "They come and insult us in
English." An opinion leader suggested that: “The staff of
the insurance scheme must be schooled on customer
relations.” (Rural & Urban Community FGD)
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Interpretation of rules
Some scheme staff were praised by community members
for using their discretion to ensure flexibility in interpreta-
tion and enforcement of national level policies and regula-
tions in ways that enhanced enrolment. Conversely others
were criticised for their lack of flexibility in enforcing rules
to the detriment of enrolment. Scheme managers some-
times found themselves in dilemmas where to use discre-
tion and bend the rules to encourage enrolment might be
at the risk of losing their jobs, for example, and yet in the
context of low levels of literacy to strictly enforce rules
such as a three month waiting period for clients who for-
got to renew their card on time sometimes came across as
inhumane and creating undue hassle for beneficiaries.
“I never applied the default policy (…) and I was
ready to answer any query to that effect (…)
because of illiteracy on the part of the client.
There are policies you can implement in certain
places conveniently, but in certain areas you
must give it a human face.” (Scheme Staff )
A rule whose vagueness left a lot of room for discre-
tion in interpretation was that guiding the decision on
“who is an indigent?”.
“The pointers to who an indigent is were not
clear. It was quite recently that social welfare
department gave some guidelines on how to
identify an indigent that we have started
registering them.” (Scheme Staff )
Though indigents are exempt from premium pay-
ment the clarity, specificity and sensitivity of opera-
tional criteria for their identification is a challenge. Act
650 (section 38) required that “The Minister on the
advice of the Council shall prescribe a means test for
determining persons who are indigent.” and “A district
mutual health insurance scheme shall on the basis of
the means test, identify and keep a list of members
registered with it who are indigent.” Act 852 (section 29)
states “The categories of persons exempted from the
payment of contributions under the scheme include (…).
A person classified by the Minister responsible for Social
Welfare as an indigent.”
Discretion was used to keep people out as well as to
swell up numbers.
“…I will keep my indigent numbers as a
banker…if I see that at the end of the month
I am not getting results, I will go to one village
and then grab all their cards and see if they are
indigents and then get the numbers up.”
(Scheme Staff )
Frontline provider implementation arrangements
Health service provider responsiveness to clients
The responsiveness of the services to the social aspira-
tions of people such as treatment with respect and dig-
nity, confidentiality, autonomy in decisions concerning
their own health and non-discrimination also affect their
acceptability. Perceptions of language barriers and reli-
gious discrimination were among responsiveness related
reasons some respondents gave as a disincentive to seek
health care that affected NHIS enrolment even when the
services were available.
‘’Health insurance is not serving the purpose
for which it was done. When we go to the
hospital and they see the “mayafi” (Hijab)
they end up insulting us that as for Muslims
they like to give birth so even when they don’t
charge others they will charge us (…)”
Urban (Community member)
‘’Sometimes too they assume everyone speaks
Ewe and English so when you can’t speak any
they get angry at you.” (Community member)
Closely related to the issue of responsiveness as a
barrier was what was described as “Attitude of health
workers”.
‘’When you come to the hospital and you are in
labour some staff do not attend to us, some too
come to work too late, they come when patients
are already waiting (…)” (Pregnant woman)
Formal out of pocket payments in provider facilities
Patients having to pay out of pocket for several services
including medicines even when insured was common in
some facilities and sometimes served as a major source of
client discontent and disinterest to enroll in the NHIS.
“Here lies the case: we talking about health
insurance here but when you go to the
hospital (…) they don’t give you the actual
medicine, they write it for you to go and buy
from the drug store. Mine (insurance card) is four
years (expired) now. I don’t want to renew it.
I will rather take money to go to the drug store
to buy the medicine than to renew it.”
(Uninsured Client, Urban community)
Community members also reported being asked to
make top up payments with the explanation that NHIS
reimbursement rates were inadequate. Long delays of
several months in provider reimbursement were blamed
by providers as well as insurance scheme staff for
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reinforcing what providers labelled as “coping” or
“managing” behaviours such as charging clients co-
payments, top up payments or balance billing; and dis-
interest in or inability to stock adequate quantities of
medicines covered by the NHIS.
“(…) you see sometimes the facilities blame us
for not paying claims on time, for owing them
so much that is why they are not able to stock
drugs (…)” (Scheme staff, Rural District)
Informal (under the table) charges
Outright under the table charges and extortion were also
reported in the community interviews. The qualitative
nature of the study did not enable quantification of the ex-
tent. Though not directly related to the NHIS or unique
to NHIS clients, they were a disincentive to use health
facilities and therefore to enrolment.
‘’Some are given drips (Intravenous infusions)
when they are due for delivery, others too they
are not given drips. But what some of the nurses
do is that even when you are not given drips
they will still ask you to go to the dispensary
and collect it. When you bring it to them they
keep it and sell to another. They also will take 2
geisha soaps and 8 cedis from you after delivery.”
(Pregnant woman community member)
Contextual factors
Poverty levels and dependency ratios were both high,
and this affected the ability to pay premiums especially
in the rural district.
“Some of them too have a large family size.
So if a peasant farmer whose income is seasonal –
and mostly when they come for the card they come as
a group – so if the card is expired within this period
it is difficult for them for renew because of the family
size.” (Scheme Management staff )
District Scheme management staff observed that bounti-
ful harvests sometimes translated into increased enrol-
ment. However in the pre-harvest period, the rains and
related intense farming activity sometimes meant limited
time for people to spend at scheme offices to enrol. In
some cases people also moved to their villages to farm,
making it even more difficult for them to come to the
scheme offices.
In the rural areas the poor road networks, further com-
plicated access to scheme offices and health facilities by
increasing the travel and time costs and thus serving as a
disincentive to enrolment related to economic context.
Politicization of the NHIS was mentioned by many
respondents as a factor that affected enrolment nega-
tively or positively depending on the details. A district
scheme staff gave an example of how they sometimes
tried to use the political interest in the scheme positively
to enrol clients.
“…what I did was to get the MP to vote some
money purposively to target the informal sector.
I decided the MPs vote will not pay the premium
in full so what we did was to ask them to contribute
about 42 % of the amount; and people patronized.
We had long queues (…) we made great impact.”
(Scheme Management staff )
On the negative side, the political debates on which
political party owned the national health insurance
scheme were perceived to have affected enrolment in
the region especially at the initial stages. At the time of
the introduction of the NHIS in 2003, there were many
strong activists of the then opposition party, in the re-
gion, who did not want to have anything to do with the
scheme. On the positive side, when this party with a
strong following in the region came to power in 2009,
the sense of ownership increased and with it, interest in
enrolment.
Respondents however mentioned that over time they
saw a growing sense that the NHIS is non partisan and
belongs to residents of Ghana rather than any political
party.
“….people try to play some sort of politics with it
but I want to say that where we have gotten to
now, so far national health insurance is concerned,
it is non-partisan and anybody that will make
it fail, Ghanaians will never forgive the person.
Even posterity will never forgive the person.”
(Scheme management staff )
The main socio-cultural factor mentioned as affecting
enrolment was a small religious sect called “The First
Church”, whose members refuse to enrol because of
their beliefs against the use of biomedical care when ill.
Its impact did not appear to be significant.
Effects on clients experiences of NHIS
The clusters of National policy, Contextual, frontline
purchaser and provider implementation arrangements
interacted with each other to produce client experiences
of the NHIS. Some of these were positive, with some clients
reporting satisfaction with having used the NHIS card, re-
ceiving prompt attention and not having to pay any bills.
Others were negative effects and ended up becoming disin-
centives to enrolment in the NHIS.
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For example, the time and travel costs of going to the
scheme offices and outlets to enrol or renew, that were
sometimes as major as a whole day or even more could
make enrolment very expensive. If, additionally, a client
experienced co-pays, balance billing and under the table
charges in a health facility, it added up to even more days
of wages spent in accessing care under a “free NHIS”.
These factors also sometimes combined to create a
negative effect of experienced discrepancies between
what was officially stated as covered by the NHIS policy
and what clients experience as covered by the NHIS in
actual use. It was commonly stated by decision makers
that the NHIS operates a generous benefit package cove-
ring about 90–95 % of common diseases in Ghana. The
impression clients got from these statements was that
once insured, all or at least almost all services would be
free at point of service use. When on presenting at
health facilities with their cards they met various co-
pays, non-available medicines that had to be purchased
outside etc. as already described; the result was often
disenchantment with, and mistrust of the NHIS and its
promises.
“The reason I enrolled is that we were promised that
when you are able to enrol you have access to
everything when you attend the hospital. But there
have been times when you go to the hospital you are
told that certain conditions are not covered by the
card or we don’t have this or that drug (…)”
(Insured community member, rural district)
Discussion and conclusions
This study aimed to understand why enrolment in the
Ghana NHIS has stagnated and the implications for policy
and program design and implementation towards uni-
versal population coverage. We explored who is enrol-
ling (or not) and barriers and enablers that explain the
observations. Rather than any single factor, we found a
multiplicity of interacting factors. These factors can be
broadly classified as related to national policy and pro-
gram arrangements, implementation arrangements and
context, and summarized in an explanatory framework
as in Fig. 1.
Attaining universal population coverage with health
insurance took several decades in lead countries such as
Germany and Japan. Germany, where classical social
health insurance originated, achieved UHC about twelve
decades after the first sickness funds became operational
[20]. Japan, who used the German model as a blue print
achieved UHC about four decades after legislation was
passed. Times for recent achievers such as South Korea,
Thailand and Taiwan have been much shorter. South
Korea achieved UHC in 1989, a little over a decade after
its revised health insurance law started implementation
in 1977 [21]. Thailand achieved UHC in 2002, a little
over two decades after its medical welfare schemes were
initiated [22, 23].
In Africa, though a UHC trail blazer with the passage
of its national health insurance law in 2003, Ghana con-
tinues to face several challenges. There are lessons from
the experiences of South Korea and Thailand to some of
the challenges to population coverage this study has un-
covered. Both countries achieved UHC while they were
still classified as LMIC. South Korea’s Gross Domestic
Product per capita in 1977 when they passed their re-
vised health insurance law was estimated at US$ 1042;
and US$ 5430 when they finally attained UHC in 1989
[22]. Thailand had a Gross National Income per capita
of US$ 390 when their medical welfare scheme started
in 1975 and US$ 1900 in 2002 when they finally attained
UHC.
Experience from CBHI schemes [15, 24] as from
Ghana’s NHIS suggest that when enrolment and re-
newal in health insurance, is predominantly voluntary,
attaining universal coverage is challenging. Ways have
to be found to introduce compulsion. Like many other
LMIC, Ghana’s large non formal sectors and the non-
existence of a universal citizen registration database, is
part of the challenge of effecting compulsory enrol-
ment. Ghana’s choice of a single payer mixed tax and
contributory insurance scheme with some out of pocket
premium payment was based on historical and prag-
matic as well as technical considerations [25]. On the
other hand, its decision to implement individual regis-
tration is a weakness that could be changed.
South Korea, from the beginning of its efforts to attain
UHC adopted family based registration. Formal sector
employee registration in the workplace was done with
their dependents as members of the scheme of the
household head. Regional arrangements for registration
of the non-formal sector also mandated household
registration.
Public and private formal sector employees in Ghana
form about 5 – 10 % of the population and are relatively
easily found on the SSNIT and other databases. Systems
to allow employer employee contributions deducted at
source for the contributor as well as dependents can be
set up. Given the average household size of 4 in Ghana,
registering dependents with employees will ensure
coverage of another 30 – 40 % of Ghana. It will also
reduce for SSNIT contributors, pensioners and their
dependents the current time and travel costs involved
in NHIS enrolment. There should be room to negotiate
an increased percentage deduction to allow dependent
coverage. In Ghana employer employee contributions
from SSNIT subscribers are 2.5 % of contributions to
the social security fund. This is low by international
standards. For example, contribution rates in South
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Korea have been about 5 % of wages on average [22].
Rates in Taiwan are similar [26].
Identification of beneficiaries is critical. For efficiency
reasons, it is worth exploring how to strengthen and use
already existing identification systems or merge systems
rather than create parallel systems. Ghana’s creation of a
special NHIS card, as this study shows, has become to
some extent a bottleneck. Thailand used their already
existing national identification system for clients to gain
access to the Thailand NHIS. Learning from this model
can remove the enrolment barriers posed by the time
and travel costs of getting a special NHIS card.
Removing the work of special card issuance and enrol-
ment of formal sector subscribers and their dependents
from the district scheme offices will also allow more re-
sources of the district schemes to be focused on identifying
and reaching the poorest of the poor. Strategies such as
door to door enrolment processes make it easier to get an
idea of living standards and incomes for targeting pur-
poses. South Korea used a community based system of
means testing to help it identify what contributions levels
would be reasonable for non-formal sector enrollees.
Currently identifying the poorest of the poor is a major
challenge to implementing the indigent exemptions
policy under the NHIS.
Ghana’s macro economy, like that of many other LMIC
is an important contextual factor influencing health
system resource availability. Thailand, South Korea
and Taiwan who have attained UHC in recent times
experienced economic growth over the period of their
transition. This made resources available to support
UHC once it was a priority government agenda. Advocacy
for UHC must be accompanied by awareness raising about
the importance of economic growth; and policies that
stimulate economic growth in LMIC. Though harder to
deal with than adjusting implementation arrangements, it
is important to keep attention on the link between na-
tional wealth and the ability to implement a public policy
focus and commitment to UHC.
This study did not set out to investigate street level
bureaucracy theory. However, some of its findings are
explained by this theory. Lipsky [27] in his exploration
of how and why some types of public service agencies
perform contrary to their own rules, coined the term
street level bureaucrats to describe “Public service workers
who interact directly with citizens in the course of their jobs
and who have substantial discretion in the execution of
their work”. He found that the combination of consider-
able discretion in decision making, regular contact with
citizens and relative autonomy from organizational
authority, meant that the sum of the individual deci-
sions, actions and inactions of street level bureaucrats be-
comes agency policy in practice. At the same time, their
conditions of work tend to induce coping behaviors that
modify policy in implementation and produce results dif-
ferent from stated agency objectives. These conditions of
work include inadequate resources, and demand for ser-
vices that tend to increase to meet supply. Agency goals
may be ambiguous, vague or conflicting. Clients are non-
voluntary with limited alternatives and control over front-
line worker behavior. It is vital that policy and program
formulation for UHC adapts principles in context through
careful observation, analysis and responsiveness to actual
and potential frontline purchaser and provider incentives
and related behaviour that may be generated at implemen-
tation levels. Otherwise avoiding policy failure and imple-
mentation gaps can be very difficult.
Conclusions
Ghana’s continuing challenges with attaining universal
population coverage in its NHIS are related to policy
and program design features as well as implementation
factors. Within any given level of resource availability, to
attain universal population coverage with a contextually
affordable package of essential care requires policy and
program design that ensures that enrolment in national
health insurance is effectively compulsory rather than
voluntary in implementation. It also requires careful
attention and responsiveness to actual and potential sub-
scriber, purchaser and provider (stakeholder) incentives
and related behaviour generated at implementation
levels. There is much that Ghana and other countries in
sub-Saharan Africa can learn, not only from the current
study of Ghana’s experience to date; but also from coun-
tries such as South Korea and Thailand in the Asian re-
gion who have attained near Universal Population
coverage and did so while they were still in the category
of lower middle income countries.
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